Abstract. We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. Data compatible with these theories are in turn characterized by the property of comonotonicity of bargaining outcomes.
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allocations of money, and the agents' disagreement points, but include no information on agents' preferences, or on the method (or protocol, or extensive-form game) that led to the division. We want to know when observed allocations are consistent with standard bargaining theory.
Several well-known theories could explain a given collection of data. We focus on the utilitarian, Nash, and egalitarian models. The utilitarian model divides the resource so as to maximize the sum of agents' utilities. The Nash bargaining model (after Nash (1950) ) seeks to maximize the product of the gains from splitting the resource. Finally, the egalitarian solution (commonly identified with Rawls (1971) ) chooses a division to maximize the utility of the worst off agent. Our goal here is to investigate the implications of these theories for certain kinds of data sets.
Data sets consist of observations of how a resource is divided amongst a set of agents, and of the relevant "disagreement point." That is, we observe how much money was at stake, how it was divided among the agents, and which outcome would have prevailed if the agents had failed to agree on a division. We do not, however, have any data on agents' preferences, or on the protocol (or underlying strategic interactions) that produced the observed allocations.
Such data is used by Hamermesh (1973) , for example. He uses data on union wage bargaining. More generally, the data could be the outcome of bankruptcy liquidation proceedings, or government subsidies. We investigate the restrictions that each of the three models, utilitarian, Nash, and egalitarian, place on the allocations of money. Essentially, we want to test the hypotheses that resources are allocated according to these bargaining theories when utility functions are assumed to be increasing and concave, but otherwise can differ across individuals.
We present two sets of results. First, in Section 4, we assume that the disagreement points are fixed across observations, and the same for all agents. A case in point is the wage bargaining data mentioned above. We provide a joint test of the hypotheses that a particular bargaining protocol is used and that the disagreement outcome is zero for all agents. We discover that the empirical content of the three models is identical: No data set of the kind we assume allows us to distinguish between them. A data set either refutes all three or is consistent with all three.
Furthermore, the theories have very weak predictive power. The only empirical prediction of any of these theories is that data should be perfectly strictly ordinally correlated, or comonotonic, and that each agent should get at least a positive amount of consumption if any other agent does. This means that when the total amount of resource increases, all agents must receive a higher amount of resource.
In fact, we show more. We show that with our assumption on data sets, comonotonicity characterizes the empirical content of theories based a large class of social welfare functions, namely, any that takes a generalized utilitarian form: that is i∈N g(u i (x i )). The utilitarian and Nash models are special cases. Our result implies a rather strong form of observational equivalence. Whenever the data are consistent with one of these theories (say Nash bargaining), then the same rationalizing utility functions serve to rationalize the observed data as generated by any of the other theories. As far as we know, our result is the first to document this strong form of observational equivalence in the revealed preference literature. We are considering three "nonnested" models, and given a rationalizable data set, we can find utility functions that serve to rationalize the data using any of the three models.
Second, in Section 5, we turn to data in which the disagreement point can vary. We observe here that the result from Section 4 readily extends to the utilitarian model, and we present a simple result on the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. The most interesting case, though, deals with the egalitarian model of bargaining.
Under the additional assumption that utility functions are the same, the egalitarian model embodies the principle of "equal gain." The increase in utility between the final outcome and the disagreement point should be equal across agents.
An interesting empirical application is to taxation. Our formal model is characterized by the similar primitives as axiomatic models of taxation (for example, Young (1988 Young ( , 1990 ). There is a natural relation between the equal gains bargaining solution and a classical egalitarian principle of taxation. We can interpret data on taxation (specifically, the tax code) as bargaining data: the disagreement point represents agents' post-tax incomes, and the division of money represents the amount they earn before taxes. Data of this kind can be readily inferred from the tax code.
The egalitarian theory we discuss is the "equal loss" principle Young (1988) . A tax code is consistent with this principle if there is a utility function for which the "loss" to all agents (as measured by the difference in utility between pre and post-tax income) is equalized. The principle of equal loss has a long history in the economics of taxation.
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We are concerned with the empirical problem of testing a tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss. The tax code is not (necessarily) a bargaining outcome, but our model can be reinterpreted to fit tax data instead of bargaining. Formally, the test coincides with our test for the equal gains bargaining solution by reinterpreting the primitives appropriately.
We present a test of this theory in the case when utility is unknown. Young (1990) studies the same problem, but using a parametric estimation approach to find the best-fitting utility index to the tax code in the United States. We present instead a non-parametric test, which can be applied to the data used by Young.
Section 5 discusses the case when utilities may differ among agents, and presents an extension to when utility is required to be concave, as it is in the rest of the paper. The results of Section 5 have an interesting byproduct: the testable implications of Hotelling's model of spatial competition Hotelling (1929) . Subsection 5.8 demonstrates how this problem is a special case of the environment studied in Section 5.
1.1. Related literature. The closest papers to ours may be Cherchye et al. (2011) and Carvajal and González (2011) . These are independently conducted investigations into the testable implications of Nash bargaining.
Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock consider a model where a pair of agents bargain over consumption decisions; so the framework is different from our focus on bargaining over money. They assume that the disagreement points vary endogenously because individual agents have the option of making consumption purchases on their own, and they characterize the rationalizable data as those that satisfy a system of quadratic inequalities. Recognizing that such a system is hard to solve, they provide a sufficient condition, and a necessary condition, which can be operationalized computationally. Finally, they carry out a laboratory experiment and show how one can use their tests.
Carvajal and González suppose that consumption is over monetary units (as we do), and develop polynomial tests of the Nash bargaining model under various hypotheses about the behavior of the disagreement point. Most of their tests characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a system of quadratic inequalities. They use the TarskiSeidenberg algorithm to construct direct tests of rationalizability in terms of data alone. A version of our Proposition 10 appears already in Carvajal and González.
The setup and methodology in both Cherchye et al. (2011) and Carvajal and González (2011) are distinct from ours, and perhaps closest to our discussion in Section 5.2. In fact, probably the method we suggest there can be applied in their frameworks, and vice versa. The boundary of the problems we can solve in revealed preference analysis is given by polynomial problems, such as the ones they analyze. It is interesting to see complementary approaches emerge.
The recent contribution of Chiappori et al. (2012) investigates the empirical content of Nash bargaining. There are several important differences between that work and ours. The main difference is that their framework assumes disagreement points are unobserved. Instead, they suppose that some vector of underlying, observable Euclidean characteristics uniquely determines both the utility functions of agents and the disagreement point. Without assuming any kind of structure on the joint dependence of disagreement point and utility on these underlying characteristics, their model obviously has no testable implications (this is their Proposition 2). To have any empirical content, they must assume some structure on the dependence of the utility function and disagreement point on these characteristics. They assume that this dependence is known to satisfy certain properties (differentiability and "exclusion restrictions") both within and across characteristics. By contrast, in our model, disagreement point observations are part of the observed data, and this leads to the falsifiability of the model.
The other main distinction between their work and ours is that they are concerned with understanding the testable implications of the model in a continuous sense-the implications of the model if we could observe the division across all possible problems. Our work, on the other hand, assumes only that a finite number of possible division problems are observed (with their solutions). The distinction in the two approaches can be best understood by considering the classical demand model: their approach is analogous to characterizing rationalizability by conditions on the Slutsky matrix, while our approach is analogous to Afriat's Afriat (1967) discussion of finite data sets that are rationalizable. Their work also notes that the testable implications of the Nash, utilitarian, and maxmin model are identical in certain frameworks.
De Clippel and Eliaz (2011) also provide an interesting study of the empirical content of a particular bargaining solution, which they call the fallback solution (which shares some ideas with the maxmin solution). Their framework is a general ("Arrovian") choice environment, where two agents decide from a finite choice set. The paper by Kıbrıs (2011) also studies bargaining solutions (albeit in a claims framework) and derives a revealed preference relation from the choices made by the solutions. Kıbrıs finds conditions on the solutions so that the implied revealed preference relation is rational.
Earlier works discussing the empirical content of Nash bargaining, usually assuming all individuals are identical and risk neutral, include Hamermesh (1973) and Bowlby and Schriver (1978) . Svejnar (1980) provides a critique of these ideas.
As earlier noted, Young (1990) constructs a test of the maxmin hypothesis, using empirical data on US income taxes from . His approach is estimation-based, and he finds that tax data are reasonably close to predicted data from the maxmin model in most years (there are exceptions). He assumes specific parametric forms for the utility function. By contrast, we provide an exact test of the maxmin model, assuming no parametric functional form. Young (1988) provides a kind of exact empirical test of the maxmin model, assuming the solutions to all possible problems are observed, and further assuming observations across different populations.
The Theories
We consider the most commonly used (cooperative) theories of bargaining. We assume an environment where some quantity m ∈ of a single-dimensional resource (e.g. money) is available, and a group of n agents needs to decide on an allocation of m. Each problem possesses a disagreement point, which is the vector of outcomes received by agents if negotiations break down. For each agent, d i is the monetary value of this outcome, and the vector
represents all the allocations of m in which each agent gets at least their disagreement points. The disagreement point is observed and known.
A bargaining theory uses information on agents' preferences to predict an outcome in B(m, d). Suppose that each agent i is described by a strictly increasing and concave utility function u i : + → .
The utilitarian theory says that m is divided so as to maximize the sum
We consider a generalization of the utilitarian theory, where for some function g : A ⊂ → , the sum
The Nash bargaining theory predicts a choice in B(m, d) that maximizes the so-called Nash product,
Note that the Nash bargaining theory is a special case of our generalization of the utilitarian theory, letting g = log.
Finally, the egalitarian (or maxmin) theory says that x ∈ B(m, d) should be chosen to maximize
These three theories have both positive and normative interpretations. Under the positive interpretation, it is evident that we may want to understand the empirical content of the theory. The theories are commonly assumed to predict an outcome in applied economic models. Probably the most commonly used is the utilitarian model, but the Nash solution also finds applications. From macroeconomics to contract theory and applied mechanism design, authors often use the Nash solution as a "reduced form" model to capture the outcome of some bargaining stage.
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From the normative viewpoint, our three theories have know axiomatizations that relate them to basic principles of justice or social welfare (see, for example, Thomson (1981) , Thomson (2010) , Lensberg (1987) , Thomson and Lensberg (1989) , Kalai (1977) ).
The Data
We assume a finite collection of observations of bargaining outcomes. A data set is a set
Note that this is indeed a generalization, as the problems of optimizing
3 See, for example, Hart (1995) for the use of Nash bargaining in the literature on incomplete contracts; and Rogerson et al. (2005) for macroeconomic search models.
represents a disagreement point and x k an outcome of bargaining. Let the set N = {1, . . . , n}. Any study of the empirical content of a theory depends crucially on what one assumes is observable. If we observe m, d, and agents' utility functions, then the theories we described in Section 2 are all testable, and each one of them makes predictions that are not made by the others.
In contrast, we assume that utility functions are not observable. Our assumption follows the mainstream revealed preference view of preference and utility: utilities are purely theoretical constructs and do not have any meaning beyond what they predict about agents' behaviorin this case joint behavior. Utilities are not observable, or even meant to be observable.
The revealed preference view is rooted in the use of field data in economics. Most data sets in economics consist of field data, and they do not normally contain information on utility functions. In the particular case of bargaining theory, the econometric studies of bargaining use data with no information on utility functions (see, for example, Hamermesh (1973) ).
Experimental researchers can, and often do, collect partial information on utility functions by the design of the experiment or by using supplementary surveys. Many experimentalists are, however, skeptical about the idea that one can control utility effectively in the laboratory. In experiments specifically designed to test bargaining theory, attempts have been made to assume as little as possible about agents' preferences. Roth, in a survey of the experimental literature on bargaining (see pages 41-43 in Roth (1995) ), argues that experiments that assume a specific utility function are problematic, and describes designs that attempt to assume as little as possible about subjects' preferences (typically only that the subjects are expected utility maximizers, but nothing about the form of the utility function). Our assumptions about data are obviously in line with such experimental designs.
Fixed and symmetric disagreement point
In this section, we suppose that the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric. Our result is that the only aspect of bargaining theory that can be tested is a basic solidarity principle. A discussion of this solidarity principle in different economic environments is presented in Sprumont (2008) .
The punchline is twofold. First, the three models of Section 2 have identical testable implications. Thus, for the kinds of data described in Section 3, if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, then the three most popular models of cooperative bargaining are observationally equivalent.
Second, the empirical predictions of these models are relatively weak: if one agent's consumption increases, then so does the consumption of all remaining agents.
With a fixed disagreement point, we assume that the disagreement point is normalized to 0. A data set (Section 3) then takes the special form
, where x k ∈ n + . Importantly, the disagreement point must be the same for all observations.
Our assumption of a common disagreement can be justified when disagreement points are observed to be fixed across observations, of course, but also when they are unobserved. In the latter case, we may choose a disagreement point as part of the exercise of constructing a rationalizing instance of the model: we are free to choose disagreements just as we are free to construct rationalizing utility functions. Now, the assumption that disagreement points can vary in arbitrary ways leads to an untestable theory; one can choose disagreement points (and utilities) to rationalize any data using, for example, Nash bargaining (Chiappori et al., 2012) . So a researcher may want to assume that the variability of the disagreement point is limited: the most natural such assumption is that it is fixed (and can then be normalized to be zero; Hamermesh (1973) is a case in point). Our test then becomes a joint test for the particular bargaining solution together with the assumption of a fixed disagreement point at zero.
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We consider the general model described in Section 2. Let g : [0, ∞) → ∪ {−∞} be a strictly increasing, smooth, and concave function. We say that data {x k } K k=1 are g-rationalizable if there exist strictly increasing, smooth, and strictly concave functions u i for which u i (0) = 0 and u i (0) = ∞ (Inada conditions), and for which
, 0) and k = 1, . . . , K. As we remarked in Section 2, the utilitarian and Nash models are special cases of g-rationalizability.
Finally, data {x k } K k=1 are maxmin rationalizable if there exist strictly increasing and strictly concave u i , normalized so that u i (0) = 0, for which min i∈N u i (x
Our result establishes a property of the data that is equivalent to rationalizability by these theories: this property yields a non-parametric test for bargaining theory. We say that data {x k } 
and a strictly increasing concave g, the following are equivalent.
(1) The data are comonotonic.
(2) The data are g-rationalizable.
(3) The data are maxmin rationalizable.
Remark 2. Our original proof of this theorem established only the equivalence of the utilitarian model, the Nash model, and the maxmin model. An anonymous referee (at the American Economic Review ) showed us how to generalize the result to the one stated above.
Remark 3. We fix g, thereby fixing a theory, and ask if there are utility functions that rationalize the observations. In principle the rationalizing utility functions could depend on the particular g under consideration. For example, the utilities that rationalize some data set as coming from Nash bargaining may differ from the utilities which give a utilitarian rationalization. Surprisingly, it turns out that the utilities we construct in the proof serve to rationalize the data for any g. (This was shown to us by the anonymous referee mentioned in Remark 2.)
In fact, it is evident from our proof that the constructed utilities also allow rationalization by any symmetric, increasing, and quasiconcave (even quasiconcavity can be weakened) function ϕ :
n → , independently of whether or not ϕ is additively separable.
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Thus the models we consider are observationally equivalent in a particularly strong sense. Rationalizable data allow us to fix the unobservable utility functions in a way that is consistent with any of the models under consideration. We cannot differentiate one model from another in terms of their implied behavior about rationalizing utility functions.
Remark 4. Dropping the hypothesis of smoothness of the u i functions and of g results in a weaker notion of comonotonicity. Dropping the hypothesis that u is strictly concave can result in models with no testable implications on our class of data. For example the utilitarian model with linear utility functions is not testable, as the theory allows for any individually-rational division of surplus.
Remark 5. Note that our notion of rationalizability requires utility functions to satisfy an Inada condition. Without the Inada condition, the theories in Section 2 may possess non-interior solutions, and the resulting data may not be comonotonic as we have defined comonotonicity (we would have a notion of comonotonicity with weak inequalities instead of strict). The equivalence between g-rationalizability and maxmin rationalizability also fails without Inada conditions. Remark 6. Suppose that our data {x k } K k=1 are such that x k ∈ n ++ for all k. Then the condition in the theorem is equivalent to the statement that for all i, j ∈ N and all k, l, x
. Section 5.1 below exploits this idea further.
Remark 7. We could suppose that for each i ∈ N , there is d i , potentially different from zero, which serves as a fixed disagreement point, and then test our theories with the corresponding d i . Our rationalizations would be required to satisfy u i (d i ) = +∞, and comonotonicity would be redefined as
In particular, if we are given data which satisfy x , and using any of the models previously discussed.
Remark 8. We could also ask about rationalization by "weighted" versions of the rules. For example, with weights α ∈ n ++ , a weighted g rule might be one that is chosen to maximize i∈N g(α i u i (x i )) over B(m, 0), subject to the constraint that i∈N x i = m. By Theorem 1, the only implication of the maximization of such rules is comonotonicity. This can be seen by finding u i functions that g-rationalize the data, and then rescaling. A similar statement holds for maxmin rationalizability.
Proof. It follows from the first order conditions that if the data are either g-rationalizable or maxmin rationalizable, then they are comonotonic. The argument for the utilitarian model is: Suppose that all agents' marginal utilities are equalized at x ∈ B(m, 0) and at x ∈ B(m , 0) with m = i x i and m = i x i . (Note that this uses the Inada conditions assumed on utilities.) Suppose that m < m . Some agent i must have x i > x i ; then all agents' marginal utilities must be smaller at the allocation x than at x and the concavity of utility implies that all
For the other direction, we show something slightly stronger: If the data are comonotonic, then there exist strictly concave, continuous, and increasing functions u i such that, if ϕ : [0, ∞) → ∪ {−∞} is a increasing, symmetric and quasiconcave function,
As a special case, we
. Note the order of the quantifiers used above: the same profile of utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n works across all ϕ.
To this end, we suppose the data are comonotonic, and ignore replications as well as points where every agent consumes 0. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that
(that this is possible follows from comonotonicity). Below we construct a profile of utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n with the property that for all k = 1, . . . , K, i∈N u i (x k i ) is maximal across all allocations y 1 , . . . , y n for which i∈N x k i = i∈N y i , and min i∈N u i (x k i ) is also maximal across all such allocations; it follows that, since each u i is strictly increasing,
We first argue that such a construction suffices to establish the result: Let ϕ be as above, and suppose by way of contradiction that there is a k and a feasible allocation (y 1 , . . . , y n ) for which ϕ(u 1 (y 1 ), . . . , u n (y n )) > ϕ(u 1 (x k 1 ), . . . , u n (x k n )). Note then, by symmetry of ϕ, that for any permutation of the agents σ : N → N , ϕ(u σ(1) (y σ(1) ), . . . , u σ(n) (y σ(n) )) = ϕ(u 1 (y 1 ), . . . , u n (y n )). Quasiconcavity of ϕ then implies that
The argument is almost identical for generalized g-utilitarianism.
For the maxmin model, it is clear that all agents must have equal utility at a given allocation. Thus, if one agent's utility goes up, so must all others. 7 Symmetry means that if σ is a permutation on {1, . . . , n} then ϕ(x σ(1) , . . . , x σ(n) ) = ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Increasing here means that if x i > y i for all i, then ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) > ϕ(y 1 , . . . , y n ).
By strict increasingness of ϕ, and using the fact that u i (x
for all feasible allocations y 1 , . . . , y n . We finish the proof by constructing, for each i, a strictly decreasing, continuous, and positive function f i , with the property that if we set u i to be the integral of f i , then the profile of utility functions (u 1 , . . . , u n ) works as required by the first part of the proof.
We proceed by induction. We ensure that, for each i ∈ N and each k, the following are true:
(1)
In the first place, for k = 1, we define for each agent j, f j (0) = +∞. The construction is done in a series of steps, labeled (1) to (6).
(1) For K, define f i (x K i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N ; (2) for x > x K i , we define f i (x) to be any strictly decreasing function, taking value everywhere less than 1 and rendering f i continuous. (3) We proceed by induction. Let k > 1 be arbitrary, and suppose that f i (x) has been defined for all x ≥ x k i . We assume that for
Recall that we have
) but we must choose it to be sufficiently large. Specifically, let z be large enough so that there is ε > 0 for which
(4) Observe that, given f j (x k−1 j ) and f j (x k j ), for any ε > 0 and any
we may define f j continuous and decreasing on x ∈ (x
This follows as we may approximate the constant functions
) arbitrarily closely pointwise by strictly decreasing and continuous functions.
is equalized across all agents, by picking
(6) In the case of k = 1, we must also maintain that
The functions f j so constructed satisfy the conditions we ask for: that for all k, f j (x k j ) is equalized across j, and
is equalized across j. By setting
we have the required u j .
Remark 9. An anonymous referee suggested to us the following explicit construction which works if we want to find rationalizations not necessarily satisfying the Inada conditions.
(1) Set f i (x 
and set f i (x
dx is the same for every i.
One way to do this is to pick
, and set
with α i * = 1 and the other α i ≤ 1 chosen to equalize integrals (z K−1 was chosen high enough so such an α i exists for every i). 
dx completes the construction.
Variable disagreement point
We now turn to data as defined in Section 3, where the disagreement point is allowed to vary from one observation to another. 5.1. The utilitarian model. Suppose that our data set satisfies x k i > d k i for all k and i. Then comonotonicity of the x variables is all that is required for utilitarian rationalizability. This is because there exist utility functions that rationalize the data in the fictitious environment in which each d k i = 0; it is easily checked that these same utility functions therefore rationalize the given data. Therefore the equivalence between comonotonicity and rationalizability by the utilitarian theory extends to the case of a variable disagreement point.
, with variable disagreement point, is Nash rationalizable if there are strictly increasing, and concave u i for which
version of the following result appears in Carvajal and González (2011).
Proposition 10. A data set D is Nash rationalizable if and only if for all i ∈ N , there are numbers
. . , K that solve the following equations: for all i, j and k,
Proposition 10 is straightforward. It says simply that we need numbers U i (z) to signify levels of utility, and M i (z) for supergradients, or marginal utilities. The first system of equalities ensures that the firstorder conditions for the maximization of the Nash product holds. The 8 An alternative model with variable disagreement would be one that seeks to maximize the sum of utilities u i (x i − d i ), but this problem is the same as the one studied in Section 4. 9 One may also be interested in data for which we may have x k i = d k i , basically allowing for corner solutions in the maximization of utilitarian welfare. One can set up a result like the one in Proposition 10 for this case, based off writing the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions. second set of inequalities makes sure that utility is increasing and that marginal utilities are supergradients of the utilities.
Proof. We first show that if we are given increasing and concave utility functions u i , then (x k 1 , . . . , x k n ) is a solution to max
.
To this end, define
Consider maximizing the function f (y) = i∈N y i subject to y ∈ U. A point u ∈ U maximizes f if and
Because f is strictly convex, and since U is convex and compact, there is a unique such maximizer u * . It is clear that u * i > 0 for all i ∈ N . This states that there is a unique solution (x k 1 , . . . , x k n ) to the Nash problem for which u i (x
. We know that i∈N λ i u i (x i ) is maximized at x k 1 , . . . , x k n across all x i for which i∈N x i = m. Our next step is to show that this can happen if and only if the vector (1/λ 1 , . . . , 1/λ n ) is proportional to a vector of supergradients.
Since the constraints x i ≥ d k i are not binding, we can set up the Lagrangean for the problem, say L(x, µ) = i∈N λ i u i (x i ) + µ(m − i∈N x i ), and note that it is equal to L(x, µ) = i∈N [λ i u i (x i ) − µx i ] + µm. We know the constraint i∈N x i = m is binding so that the solution to the maxmin problem features µ * > 0. For µ * , we know that max x L(x, µ * ) is equal to the maximum Nash product subject to the constraint, and has the same solution. This is equivalent to saying that
for all x i , or, rewriting:
This is equivalent to saying that (µ * /λ 1 , . . . , µ * /λ n ) is a supergradient, or that the vector (1/λ 1 , . . . , 1/λ n ) is proportional to a supergradient.
Another way of saying that (1/λ 1 , . . . , 1/λ n ) is proportional to a supergradient is to say that for all i ∈ N , there is a supergradient
Writing out the explicit form of λ and eliminating terms, this is equivalent to saying that
, which is precisely the condition in the theorem. The other conditions simply say that M i is a supergradient, and that u i is strictly increasing.
Conversely, the details of how to construct a utility function from these numbers essentially follow from Afriat, defining
, where the infimum is taken over all data points. It is then simple to verify by construction that for all
is a supergradient of u i at z. From this, the fact that the equality in the statement of the theorem is solved implies that the Nash product is maximized for this collection of utility functions (by the previous argument).
For Proposition 10 to be useful, it must be accompanied by a procedure that one can perform on a data set and decide if the data are Nash rationalizable or not. Such a procedure is discussed in Chambers and Echenique (2011); suffice it to say here that it is based on a computational version of results in real algebraic geometry. There is a sort of "theorem of the alternative" applying to systems of polynomial inequalities. In Chambers and Echenique (2011) we explain how these results can be used to operationalize the test in Proposition 10.
5.3. The egalitarian model. Finally, we turn to the egalitarian, or max-min, model. A data set D is egalitarian rationalizable if there are continuous and strictly increasing utility functions u i : + → such that, for all k, i and j,
We first discuss a strong version of the theory, called the equal gains theory, where we require that all agents share the same utility function u.
We have emphasized that observations (x k , d k ) should be interpreted as bargaining outcomes, where d k is a disagreement point, but there are other interpretations. We can, instead, think of x k i as agent i's pre-tax income and d k i as his income after taxes. This interpretation is completely unrelated to bargaining, but leads to the same mathematical formalism. Then, to require that there be some increasing function u for which for all i, j,
says that the tax-code is compatible with all agents sharing equally in the loss of utility derived from taxation. Young (1990) studies the equal gains (or equal loss) model, under the taxation interpretation. Young's empirical results are of a parametric nature. In contrast, we present a non-parametric test for the compliance of the tax code with the principle of equal gains.
Our first result assumes only that u is increasing. Our second result requires that u is also concave (as in the results of Section 4). Below we also discuss the (easy) extension to when utility is allowed to differ across agents.
To begin to understand the empirical content of the equal gains model, let us suppose we have two agents, so that N = {1, 2}, and that we observe the two data points:
We claim that this data set cannot be rationalized. To see why, suppose that u were a utility function rationalizing these data using the equal gains model. Then we would have u(5) − u(0) = u(8) − u(7), and u(2)−u(1) = u(8)−u(3). Therefore, since u(5)−u(0)+u(7)−u(8) = 0 and u(8) − u(3) + u(1) − u(2) = 0 we must have
But we can regroup terms in this expression, obtaining the following:
(2) [−u(2)+u (7) The contradiction arises because the increasingness of u implies that each term in brackets in equation (2) is nonnegative, and at least one of them is strictly positive (in fact, each of the terms [−u(2) + u (7)], [−u(3) + u (5)], and [−u(0) + u (1)] is strictly positive). Therefore, the terms cannot add up to zero. To develop a feeling for what kinds of data are rationalizable, consider a somewhat more involved example. The example helps to motivate the condition that we shall arrive at in the next result. Consider the data: A rationalizing utility u must satisfy u(3) − u(1) = u(9) − u(8), u(5) − u(2) = u(9) − u(8), u(4) − u(2) = u(10) − u(9), and u(4) − u(0) = u(10) − u(9). By adding and subtracting, we obtain:
But note again, by regrouping, we obtain:
And again, using the increasingness of u, each of the terms inside the brackets is nonnegative, and some are strictly positive. This results in a contradiction. In each of the two examples, what we have done is the following. We have taken data points that, if rationalizable, should force a certain expression to add to zero. By regrouping the terms, the increasingness of u forces a contradiction; the expression could not possibly add to zero if utility is increasing. It turns out that the inability to regroup data in this sense is necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalizable. The inability to regroup data in the appropriate way is a condition (or a nonparametric test) that is equivalent to rationalization by the equal gains model.
In order to formalize our condition, we have to be more specific in what we mean by "regrouping data." It is easiest to think of this in graph theoretic terms. In equation (1), we can think of edges pointing from 7 to 8, from 8 to 3, from 5 to 0, and from 1 to 2. Note that these edges come in "pairs," for example, the edge pointing up from 7 to 8 comes from the data point (d 1 , x 1 ) = ((0, 7), (5, 8)), and is naturally paired with the edge pointing down from 5 to 0. Likewise, the edge pointing up from 1 to 2 is naturally paired with the edge pointing down from 8 to 3. The interesting point is that when we put these edges together in the appropriate sequence, they form a cycle: see Figure 1 . Consider the "edges" (7, 8), (8, 3), (5, 0), (1, 2). The endpoints of adjacent edges here are ordered, where we treat (1, 2) and (7, 8) to be adjacent. That is, the second number (number 8) of the node (7, 8) is less than or equal (in fact, equal) to the first number in (8, 3) . And so forth, for each pair of adjacent edges. In fact, the second number (3) of the node (8, 3) is strictly less than the first number (5) in (5, 0). And, returning to equation (2), we see that when we regroup the data, the term −u(3) + u(5) appears.
We proceed to define our condition formally. First, we define a cycle to be a finite sequence of ordered pairs of real numbers, {(z
, for which for some l, z
is a (strict) cycle. Then the ordered pairs {(7, 8), (8, 3), (5, 0), (1, 2)} from our first example form a strict cycle.
We might conjecture that for data not to be rationalizable, we should be able to pair "up" edges with "down" edges in a way that forms a strict cycle. But this is not quite enough. If we look at the regrouping in the second example, we again pair up edges with down edges. But we do not end up with a single cycle. In fact, we end up with two cycles, only one of which is strict. Namely, the edges {(1, 3), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 0), (8, 9), (9, 10), (10, 9), (9, 8)} do not themselves form a cycle, but the two sets of edges {(1, 3), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 0)}, {(8, 9), (9, 10), (10, 9), (9, 8)} each form a cycle. Only the first cycle here is strict, but that is all we need.
In general, we can see there is no reason that a sequence of paired edges need correspond to one, two, or even k cycles. All that we need to obtain a contradiction is that data can be grouped into paired edges that can be partitioned into cycles, at least one of which is strict. These observations motivate the following definitions.
Let L be a natural number, and let
can be partitioned into cycles if there exists a natural number T , and for each t ≤ T , a collection of finite sequences {(z 1 tl , z 2 tl )} Lt l=1 that define cycles (at least one cycle of which is strict), for which there exists a bijection f :
The inability to partition paired data points into cycles is exactly the necessary and sufficient condition needed to guarantee that data are rationalizable.
can be partitioned into cycles, at least one of which is strict.
Two points are worth mentioning. The definition of cycle does not preclude repetition of elements; nor does the notion of "sequence of data points" referred to in the statement of the proposition. As a result, it may not be obvious how to operationalize the test.
An alternative, computationally viable, test to the condition in Proposition 11 is the following. There is a rationalizing utility if and only if the following linear program has a solution (u, e) with e > 0:
Here, X ⊆ n is a finite set such that d k , x k ∈ X for all k. For any z ∈ X, 1 z denotes the vector in |X| with a 0 in all its entries, except that corresponding to z. A vector u ∈ |X| is simply a utility function:
it assigns a real number to each z ∈ X. With this interpretation in mind, the constraints
in the program above simply recast the conditions of the egalitarian model (we have expressed the equality in the egalitarian model as two weak inequalities). The constraints that
when z < z express the fact that u is monotonically increasing. The scalar e is simply an artifact to capture the existence of a solution: it is a (standard) way of writing the problem of the existence of a solution to a system of inequalities as an optimization problem.
10
The relation between Proposition 11 and the linear program above is obvious from the proof. In fact, the proof of Proposition 11 follows from using the following version of a result in linear programming (Farkas's Lemma).
be a finite collection of vectors in Q n . Let L be an integer with 1 ≤ L ≤ K. Then one and only one of the following statements is true.
i) There exists y ∈ n such that for all i = 1, ..., L, A i · y ≥ 0 and
Proof. Statements i) and ii) cannot simultaneously hold. To see why, suppose that there exist y and z as stated. Then
since there is some j ∈ {L + 1, . . . , K} for which z j A j · y > 0, and for all i, z i A i · y ≥ 0, we conclude that
We now establish that if ii) does not hold, i) holds. By Theorem 3.2 of Fishburn (1973) , if ii) does not hold, there exists y ∈ Q n such that
5.4. Proof of Proposition 11. Let X ⊆ n be a finite set such that
The notation 1 x refers to a vector of zeroes and ones, with a one in the x coordinate and zero elsewhere (an indicator function).
There is a rationalizing u if and only if there is a solution to the system of linear inequalities:
Statement (3) defines a collection of inequalities, one for each i, j and k. Statement (4) defines another set of inequalities, one for each z , z ∈ X with z < z .
Once a solution to the linear inequalities has been obtained, the function u can be completed by linear interpolation.
By Lemma 12, there is no solution to system (3)- (4) ); let A U be the collection with λ k,i,j copies of (1
). Let f : A D → A U be the bijection that associates each now turn to ask for the additional testable implications of requiring the rationalizing u to be concave in the egalitarian model.
The answer is not so difficult and is closely related to work of Afriat (1967) , Richter and Wong (2004) , and Kalandrakis (2010) . To simplify matters, we suppose in this section that all observed data points are rational. Thus, say that a data set D is rational-valued if all d k i and all x k i are elements of Q. We say that a data set D is concave rationalizable if there is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave u : + → for which for all k, i and j, u(x
. Our first task is to describe an example whereby concave rationalizability fails. It is easy to construct such an example: consider the two agent case, and the one point data set
How can we see that there is no concave u that concave-rationalizes this data set? Clearly, if a concave u exists, it must be that u(2) ≥ (2/3)u(3) + (1/3)u(0), or 3u(2) ≥ 2u(3) + u(0). This expression is obviously equivalent to 2[u(2) − u(3)] + [u(2) − u(0)] ≥ 0. Finally, we know that [u(3) − u(2)] + [u(0) − u(2)] = 0, so by adding the two terms, we obtain [u(2) − u(3)] ≥ 0, which we know to be a contradiction to increasingness. If we think in the context of the previous section, what we are doing is adding new types of "edges" to our graph. In the previous section, we could add an edge from d k i to x k i so long as we added a corresponding edge from some x k j to d k j . Now, we are also allowed to add certain "collections" of edges; namely, any collection { (a 1 , b) , ..., (a n , b)} for which nb = n l=1 a l ; that is, b is a rational convex combination of the a l terms. This is precisely what we did in the previous example. We have the collection of edges (3, 2), (3, 2), (0, 2), which comes from the fact that 2 = (2/3)3 + (1/3)0. To this, we add the edges (2, 3) and (2, 0), which comes from the fact that we have equal gains. Combining these together results in the cycles ((3, 2), (2, 3)), ((0, 2), (2, 0)), and (3, 2).
Note that the singleton element (3, 2) is by itself a strict cycle.
To this end, we discuss the following generalization of the concept from the previous section. We say a collection of ordered pairs
is a convex combination of the a o terms. Note that we do not preclude the possibility of several a o terms being equal.
Let P be a natural number. For each p ≤ P , let L p be a natural number, and let {(a that define cycles (at least one cycle of which is strict), for which there exists a bijection f : 
in D, agents i l = j l for all l, and Q convex collections {(a
Remark 14. The assumption in this section that the data are rational is not without loss of generality. The reason has to do with our notion of "convex collection," which only allows for b to be a rational convex combination of the a o terms. However, a counterpart of Proposition 13 that allows for irrational data could be presented in terms of graphs with weighted edges (which would allow edges to have irrational weights), requiring conservation of flow, and precluding strict cycles. The case in Proposition 13 corresponds to the case in which the weights of all edges are rational valued.
5.6. Proof of Proposition 13. Let X ⊆ n be a finite set such that
We introduce two copies of X, one whose indicator functions are written in the standard way (1 x ). The indicator functions for the second copy are written 1 x . There is a rationalizing u if and only if there is a solution to the system of linear inequalities in the X dimensional variables u and α,
where equation (6) is required for z and z with z > z.
To see why, suppose there is a rationalizing u. Without loss, we may suppose that u is piecewise linear (if u concave rationalizes the data, then so does the piecewise linear function that takes the same values as u for every x . This is the content of equation (7). The other two inequalities are obviously satisfied.
Conversely, suppose the three equations are satisfied. First, we claim that without loss, each α term is greater than zero. For example, if we consider α x where x < y for some y ∈ X, then by equation (7), it follows that α x (y − x) + u x − u y > 0, or α x > (u y − u x )/(y − x) (since u y > u x by equation (6)). Further, if there is no y ∈ X for which y > x, then we can always redefine α x = min y∈X,x =y (u y − u x )/(y − x) > 0, which results in another system of consistent weights.
Then it is a standard trick, due to Afriat (1967) , to define u(y) = min x∈X u x + α x (y − x), and note that this function is concave, strictly increasing, and rationalizes the data. Now, we can sketch the argument as to why the satisfaction of the system of inequalities is equivalent to the absence of cycles as stated in Proposition 13. It is again an application of Lemma 12. Equations (5) through (7) The proof now proceeds in the same way as the proof of Proposition 11. There is only one change. Now, we also consider a collection of X dimensional vectors {−1, 0, 1}, which we call A C , which consists of η z,z copies of each 1 z − 1 z . The graph G = (X, E) is now constructed in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 11, letting there be one edge from x to x for each copy of 1 x − 1 x in A D , A U , A M or A C . Now, consider equation (8). This equation implies in particular that for all z , z η z,z (z − z ) = 0, in other words, the collection of edges pointing to z in A C form a concave collection. 5.7. Generalization. We have asked for data to be rationalized by a single utility function, common to all i ∈ N . If, instead, we ask that for each i, there exists u i : → for which for all i, j ∈ N u i (x
we obviously get a weaker condition. The weakening required here is simply that when partitioning data into cycles, each cycle can only contain edges corresponding to a single agent. The proof is similar to the proceeding and is hence omitted. 5.8. An application to spatial competition. The result in Proposition 11 has a simple application to the testable implications of Hotelling's model of spatial competition (Hotelling (1929) ). Hotelling's model concerns the location of two vendors on a unidimensional space, and a distribution of consumers. Consumers always buy from the vendor closest to them (in the case of equidistant vendors, half of the consumers go to one vendor, and the other half to the other), and each vendor's profit consists of how many consumers buy from him. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game has both vendors locating at the median of the distribution of consumers. Hotelling's model is not about bargaining, but it seems potentially useful to point out the application of our results.
In 
imagine that in the previous section we had only two agents (|N | = 2), and
This leads us directly to the following corollary. 
can be partitioned into cycles.
Conclusion
We consider finite sets of observations of bargaining outcomes. Assuming that utility function are unobservable, we develop testable implications of some of the best-known models in bargaining theory.
We consider two basic frameworks. Our results are sharpest for the case where we assume that disagreement points are fixed across observations. We show that the utilitarian, Nash bargaining, and egalitarian max-min models are all observationally equivalent. Further, we show that a simple test for these models consists in checking that the observed allocations are comonotonic.
When disagreement points can vary, we present a characterization of the data that are consistent with a form of egalitarianism, namely the model of equal gains/losses. By appropriately interpreting the model, we can apply our results to data on the tax code: we can check for consistency of the tax code with the principle of equal loss, when the utility function is unknown.
